

Commandant's NOTE

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TOMORROW'S INFANTRY

Infantrymen everywhere will understand my pleasure and pride in returning to Fort Benning to become simultaneously the Army's Chief of Infantry, the commander of the Infantry Center, and the Commandant of the Infantry School.

I am fortunate to have arrived here fresh from commanding the 7th Infantry Division (Light). That experience and the perspective of the present one combine to give me a good awareness of the needs of our Infantrymen in the field and a recognition of the work the people here are doing to meet many of those needs.

In the few weeks I have been at Fort Benning, I have found there is a new sense of urgency to innovate, adapt, and exploit the many lessons we have learned in recent years, and to project today's Infantryman into every conceivable combat environment. This, my first Commandant's Note, identifies what I believe is the essential direction we must take to shape tomorrow's Infantry. I see our major priorities as being doctrine, training, and force structure and modernization.

Doctrine. The Infantry of the future will have to be agile, ichal, and deployable. The rapidly changing international environment demands that the Infantry be capable of responding to a wide array of threats in a wide variety of geographical conditions.

Doctrine is the foundation upon which all the other elements of Infantry proponency are based. It drives our training and education programs, force structure and design initiatives, materiel development and acquisition, and development process.

Since 1982, AirLand Battle doctrine has been the Army's capstone operational doctrine. The essence of this doctrine is simultaneous operation over the full breadth of the battlefield. It has application throughout the operational continuum.

My experience indicates that as the Army evolves its AirLand Battle Future doctrine, the Infantry must place special emphasis on operations short of war. This will continue to be the most likely form of conflict in the 1990s and beyond. It is also probably the least understood and the most diffi-

cult to prepare for. It includes supporting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and conducting peacetime contingency operations. It also recognizes that many Third World countries have modern and sophisticated weapons that pose a serious challenge.

Lam particularly concerned that our Infantry doctrine consider the interoperability of special operating forces with conventional forces. Similarly, we must learn how to better integrate light and heavy forces. With the increased emphasis on contingency operations, the Infantry's ability to deploy and employ the appropriate mix of special, light, and heavy forces will take on increased importance.

Our development of new Infantry systems and their integration into the Infantry force structure must be based on emerging Infantry doctrine. This doctrine now focuses on light and heavy Infantry systems antiarmor weapons, and mortars, which form the current basis of Infantry functions on the modern battlefield. In our future doctrinal reviews, we must revalidate the continuing need for each of these functions. In this review process, nothing can be neld sacrosanct. Every function must be justified on the basis of need, not of tradition.

Training. Preparing Infantry leaders and soldiers to fight, win, and survive is our training quandate. The quality of that training effort is a measure of our readiness and the credibility of our deterrent capabilities.

In training the future Infantry force, we will take on unique challenges, the most obvious of which will be the one posed by reduced resources. It is getting more and more expensive to train to the required standards of proficiency, and resources to support that training are becoming less readily available. The old adage of training smarter with less is a reality that we must learn to deal with.

But how do we do that?

First, we must demand the development of Infantry systems on which Infantrymen can rapidly master and sustain their skills. We cannot afford to field systems that require inordinate amounts of training time to sustain individual proficiency. Individual proficiency must be mastered rapidly and sustained through multi-echelon training so that we can concentrate our efforts on the complexities of collective training.

Second, we must emphasize weapon training. Infantry soldiers must be trained individually to specific combat marksmanship standards that include single and multiple targets, both moving and stationary, as well as fully and partially exposed targets under all battlefield conditions, including day and night (using artificial illumination, passive, and thermal sights) and NBC engagements. We must be as effective at night with our weapons as we are during

Finally, the School has been, and will continue to be, an active participant in many of the Army's simulation programs. It has continually emphasized the design and use of simulators to support specific training and analytical objectives. Today, the reasons for using these and other training aid devices, simulations, and simulators are even better than they were when the programs began. Not only do we have fewer resources, there is an ever-increasing demand on those we do have—manpower, equipment, ammunition, POL, as well as travel and training time. All of these resources, it is important to remember, translate into money, which will not be plentiful in the years ahead.

Teamot overemphasize the critical role our Infantrymen play in combat. The recently completed Operation JUST CAUSE reaffirmed its importance to combat success.

If we are to have an agile and lethal Army, then we must also have effective Infantry leaders at all tevels, but particularly at the small unit levels. They must be agile in the sense that they have been trained to think on their feet, react quickly to changing combat situations, and act independently if need be. They must be lethal in the sense of being physically fit and capable of properly employing every soldier and every bit of firepower at their disposal.

in short, our small unit leaders, both commissioned and

noncommissioned officers, must be positive, proficient firm, and professional. It is the function of the School leader development courses—OCS, IOBC, IOAC, and NCC Academy courses—to give our Infantrymen the leaders they deserve.

Force Structure and Modernization. Combat developments is the starting point for all activities at the Infants. School. Our future will be greatly influenced by the qualify of thought and effort we put into our analytical work to day. Our vision of the Infantry's future battlefield roles and missions, and of its ability to deploy anywhere in the world will drive the design of the Infantry's organizations and the modernization of its weapons and equipment.

With mometary reductions looming on the horizon, we must look closely at their effect on the Infantry force and develop strategies that will best align and prepare the Infantry force for the future.

The 1990s and beyond will be a challenging period for the Infantry. As already mentioned, competition for resources will be keener than ever. Although our branch will become small er, it must become even better. While the threat is changing, there is still a probability of conflict almost anywhere in our complex world, and we must not become completent. The Army's challenge is the Infantryman's challenge. The Infantry has always led the way in the past and will continue to lead the way and meet the challenges of the future.

We will work hard to make sure the Infantryman can perform to the fullest his role as a member of the combined arms team. To meet these challenges, we need you ideas, suggestions, and feedback. I realize that those of you in the trenches' have more than enough to do in handling your units' daily training and maintenance and that you may find it difficult to take time to worry about the challenges facing our branch as a whole. But if we are to succeed at meeting those challenges, we must have your input slet us hear from you!

